Ekonomická a finančná matematika

Seminár CEF 14.11. D.Vorobyev (CERGE-EI) - ZRUSENY
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Autor:  chladna [ Str Nov 07, 2012 1:00 pm ]
Predmet príspevku:  Seminár CEF 14.11. D.Vorobyev (CERGE-EI) - ZRUSENY

Vážení kolegovia,

pozývame Vás na seminár Centra pre ekonómiu a financie Fakulty matematiky, fyziky a informatiky Univerzity Komenského.
Jeho obsahom bude prednáška:

Dmitriy Vorobyev (CERGE-EI):

Participation and Welfare in Fraudulent Elections,

ktorá sa uskutoční v stredu 14.11.2012 o 15.00

v posluchárni C na FMFI UK.

Abstrakt prednášky:

I analyze a costly voting model of elections, where the incumbent can stuff the ballot box, to study how electoral fraud affects voters’ behavior. I show that two stable equilibria may exist. In addition to low turnout equilibrium, which exists when the incumbent’s ability to steal ballots is sufficiently strong, there may also exist a more efficient coordination equilibrium, where a substantial share of a challenger’s supporters vote and the number of stolen votes is relatively small. Since, when making a voting decision, the challenger’s supporters do not take into account externalities they produce, coordination equilibrium is generally still not fully efficient, and the sign of inefficiency depends on the size of candidates’ supports: when there is a relatively large number of challenger’s supporters, equilibrium turnout is lower than the efficient level and thus subsidizing participation as well as introducing compulsory voting may improve efficiency. Additionally, the model simultaneously explains two empirical observations about fraudulent elections: a positive relationship between fraud and victory margin and the negative effect of fraud on turnout.

Tešíme sa na Vašu účasť,


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